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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK








Joseph F. Bianco, District Judge:
Plaintiff Christos Alexiadis (“plaintiff’ 
or “Alexiadis”) brings this action against the 
New York College of Health Professions 
(“College”), Lisa E. Pamintuan 
(“Pamintuan”), Errol Virasawmi 
(“Virasawmi”), and Steven Haffner 
(“Haffner”) (collectively, “defendants”) 
alleging violations of Title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 
42 U.S.C. § 12112; Title III of the ADA, 42 
U.S.C. § 12182; and the Rehabilitation Act, 
29 U.S.C. § 794. Plaintiff also alleges the 
following state law claims: breach of 
contract, false arrest, false imprisonment, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
negligence, violations of N.Y. Exec. Law 
§ 296, violations of the New York State 
Constitution, and respondeat superior. In 
particular, plaintiff alleges that he is a 
disabled individual due to his HIV-positive
status and related illnesses, and that he was 
arrested, suspended, and subsequently 
dismissed from the College as a 
consequence of his disability. Defendants 
contend that his arrest and dismissal from 
the College were not based upon his alleged 
disability, but rather were based upon his 
theft of a bag of hand sanitizer from a 
hallway dispenser outside of a classroom on 
July 31, 2009. Plaintiff counters that this 
purported reason was simply pretext in that 
he was bringing the hand sanitizer into the 
classroom so that students could use it 
before their lab session and, in his 
deposition, the professor confirmed that he 
saw plaintiff, on the day in question, sharing 
the hand sanitizer with other students.
Defendants move for summary judgment 
on the grounds that: (1) plaintiff’s ADA 
Title I claim is unexhausted; (2) the adverse 
action here was not taken “because of” 
plaintiff’s alleged disability; (3) plaintiff’s
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HIV-positive status does not qualify him as 
disabled under the ADA; and (4) even if 
plaintiff met his initial burden to present a 
prima facie case of discrimination, 
defendants have met their burden to show 
that plaintiff’s dismissal was based upon 
legitimate, non-discriminatory grounds.
For the reasons set forth below, the 
Court holds that there is a genuine dispute as 
to material facts concerning (1) whether 
plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of 
the ADA; (2) whether defendants’ actions 
were taken “because o f’ plaintiff’s disabled 
status; and (3) whether defendants’ 
explanation for their actions with respect to 
plaintiff was pretextual. Accordingly, the 
Court denies defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment with respect to the 
public accommodation claim under Title III 
of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182; the claim 
under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 794; and the claim under N.Y. Exec. Law 
§ 296. The Court grants defendants’ motion 




The Court has taken the facts set forth 
below from the parties’ depositions, 
affidavits, and exhibits, and from the parties’ 
respective Rule 56.1 Statements of Facts. 
Upon consideration of a motion for 
summary judgment, the Court shall construe 
the facts in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party. See Capobianco v. City 
of New York, 422 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2005). 
Unless otherwise noted, where a party’s 56.1 
Statement is cited, that fact is undisputed or
the opposing party has pointed to no 
evidence in the record to contradict it.1
1. Enrollment and Work-Study Experience
On December 10, 2008, plaintiff
completed an application to enroll in the 
College’s full-time Massage Therapy 
Program beginning in January 2009. (Defs.’
56.1 ^ 1.) With his application, plaintiff 
enclosed a high school diploma from 
Belford High School. (Pl.’s 56.1 ^ 2.) A 
valid high school diploma or equivalent 
qualification is a prerequisite for admission 
to the College, as well as a requirement to 
receive a massage therapy license from New 
York State. (Defs.’ 56.1 ^ 2.) Plaintiff 
believed the diploma to be valid at the time 
he submitted it to the College, but later 
learned, in 2010, that the diploma was not 
valid. (Pl.’s 56.1 ^ 2.) Plaintiff was accepted 
as a student in the Massage Therapy 
Program at the College in December 2008 
and began the process of enrollment in 
January 2009. (Pl.’s 56.1 ^ 3, Defs.’ 56.1 
H 3.)
Plaintiff applied for employment in the 
College’s Financial Aid Department under 
the Federal Work-Study program, and was 
hired by the College as an Administrative 
Assistant in the Financial Aid Department 
on or about June 26, 2009, where he was 
paid ten dollars an hour. (Pl.’s 56.1 ^ 4, 
Defs.’ 56.1 ^ 4.) Plaintiff’s supervisor, an 
employee of the College, signed and 
approved his time sheet showing that he
1 In addition, although the parties’ Rule 56.1 
Statements contain specific citations to the record to 
support their statements, the Court has cited to the 
Rule 56.1 Statements, rather than the underlying 
citation to the record, when utilizing the 56.1 
Statements for purposes of this summary of facts.
2
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2worked in excess of twenty hours per week. 
(Pl.’s 56.1 |  4.) The College was not aware 
that plaintiff had submitted a resume 
containing false employment experience, as 
well as a false educational history. (Defs.’
56.1 |  5.) Defendants contend that plaintiff 
submitted time sheets that showed that 
plaintiff was claiming to work when he was 
actually attending classes. (Id.) Plaintiff 
asserts, however, that the time sheets were 
signed and approved by the College and 
plaintiff had been excused from class or 
class had been cancelled on the days in 
question. (Pl.’s 56.1 |  5.)
2. Plaintiff’s Disclosure of His HIV-Positive 
Status
At the end of May and lasting into early 
June 2009, plaintiff suffered from a Staph 
infection, which caused him to be absent 
from several classes. (Defs.’ 56.1 |  6.) In 
early June 2009, plaintiff disclosed that he 
was HIV-positive to Stephanie Kraszewski 
(“Kraszewski”), the Director of Student 
Services, and to Haffner, then the Dean of 
Students and a professor. (Id.) Defendants 
allege that plaintiff also disclosed his HIV­
positive status to Dr. Richard Keohane 
(“Keohane”), plaintiff’s Anatomy and 
Physiology Professor, in early June 2009. 
(Id.) Plaintiff contends that he disclosed his 
HIV-positive status to Keohane two to three 
months prior to June 2009. (Pl.’s 56.1 |  6.) 23
2 Defendants contend that plaintiff was limited to 
working twenty hours per week. (Defs. ’ 56.1 |  4.)
3 Haffner was appointed to the position of Dean of 
Students by Pamintuan, the President of the College. 
(Pl.’s Counter-Statement (“C.S.”) 56.1 |  2.) Haffner 
later became the Dean of the School of Massage 
Therapy, where he was in charge of setting the class 
schedule and overseeing faculty. (Id. | |  1, 3.) 
Keohane was promoted to Acting Dean of the School 
of Massage Therapy in January 2011. (Id. |  12.)
Plaintiff alleges that, after he disclosed 
his HIV status to Haffner, Haffner stopped 
greeting plaintiff in the morning, which was 
contrary to how he treated plaintiff prior to 
learning of plaintiff’s HIV status. (Pl.’s C.S.
56.1 |  91.) Plaintiff also disclosed to Kristen 
Alexander (“Alexander”), his supervisor in 
the Office of Admissions, that he was HIV­
positive after he returned from a two-week 
absence for a Staph infection. (Id. |  88.) One 
week after plaintiff disclosed to Alexander 
and Haffner that he was HIV-positive, Mary 
Rodas (“Rodas”), the Director of 
Admissions, began slamming the door to her 
office while plaintiff was working in the 
office, began checking plaintiff’s work- 
study hours, and made plaintiff sign a piece 
of paper saying he would not work in excess 
of ten hours. (Id. |  93.) After plaintiff 
disclosed his HIV status to Haffner, plaintiff 
observed Haffner, Pamintuan (the President 
of the College), and Virasawmi (the Chief 
Financial Officer of the College) clustered 
together, on at least two or three occasions, 
making comments directed at plaintiff. (Id. 
|  98.) Pamintuan’s secretary also treated 
plaintiff very coldly and closed the office 
door on plaintiff when plaintiff went to give 
Pamintuan paperwork. (Id. |  101.)
Pamintuan gave plaintiff unpleasant looks 
when plaintiff dropped off paperwork. (Id. 
|  102.) Haffner’s demeanor changed after 
plaintiff disclosed his HIV status, becoming 
very cold and avoiding speaking to plaintiff. 
(Id. |  103.)
3. Hand Sanitizer Incident
On July 30, 2009, during class, Keohane 
asked students to practice conducting 
palpitations on one another, and instructed 
the students to clean their hands, preferably 
with soap and water, but suggested hand 
sanitizer as an alternative. (Defs.’ 56.1 |  7, 
Pl.’s 56.1 |  7.) Hand sanitizer was available
3
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in the room, but the supply ran out while the 
students were cleaning their hands. (Defs.’
56.1 U 7, Pl.’s 56.1 U 7.) Plaintiff went 
looking for hand sanitizer because he was 
not sure if a Staph infection he had 
contracted earlier was still contagious. (Pl.’s 
C.S. 56.1 U 19.) Plaintiff asserts that he 
asked Keohane if he could go get hand 
sanitizer, and Keohane granted him 
permission to do so. (Id. U 20.) Keohane 
states that he gave students permission to 
leave the room to clean their hands, but he 
did not give permission to “break open a 
hand sanitizer and bring it into the 
classroom.” (Pl.’s Ex. G, Keohane 
Deposition (“Keohane Dep.”) at 67:15­
68:6.) Plaintiff then went into the hallway 
and opened a wall-mounted hand sanitizer 
dispenser and removed one of the cartridges 
inside that contained the hand sanitizing 
liquid. (Defs.’ 56.1 U 8, Pl.’s 56.1 U 8.) A 
surveillance camera recorded plaintiff 
opening the dispenser and removing the 
cartridge. (Defs.’ 56.1 U 8.) Plaintiff then 
returned to the classroom, where, plaintiff 
contends, he distributed the hand sanitizer 
amongst his classmates. (Pl.’s 56.1 U 8.) 
Keohane, at his deposition, confirmed that 
plaintiff was sharing the hand sanitizer with 
students in the class. (Keohane Dep. at 
62:7-13.)
On July 31, 2009, Virasawmi was 
informed by College security and 
maintenance staff that a student had been 
caught on videotape removing a cartridge of 
hand sanitizer from a wall dispenser. (Defs.’
56.1 U 9, Pl.’s 56.1 U 9.) After viewing the 
video from College security, Virasawmi 
called the Old Brookville Police Department 
to report the alleged theft. (Defs.’ 56.1 U 9, 
Pl.’s 56.1 U 9 ) Officers from the Old 
Brookville Police Department arrived at the 
College later that day and spoke to 
Virasawmi and Pamintuan, viewed two
pictures from the video of plaintiff by the 
hand sanitizer dispenser,4 and requested to 
question plaintiff. (Defs.’ 56.1 U 10, Pl.’s
56.1 U 10.) Haffner escorted the plaintiff to 
the office where the police officers were 
waiting, and the officers interviewed 
plaintiff. (Defs.’ 56.1 U 11.) The officers 
also spoke with Virasawmi and Pamintuan. 
(Defs.’ 56.1 U 11, Pl ’s 56.1 U 11.) The 
police did not interview Haffner or 
Keohane. (Defs.’ 56.1 U 12, Pl.’s 56.1 UU 11, 
12.) Defendants contend that plaintiff did 
not claim to the police, while he was being 
interviewed by the police at the College, that 
he had permission from Keohane to open the 
hand sanitizer cartridge. (Defs.’ 56.1 U 12.) 
According to the testimony of arresting 
officer Sergeant Thomas Egan (“Egan”), 
plaintiff told him at some point -  either at 
the College or at police headquarters -  that a 
teacher gave him permission to take the 
sanitizer. (Pl.’s Ex. I, Egan Deposition 
(“Egan Dep.”) at 28:6-24.) Plaintiff was 
arrested and charged with petit larceny. 
(Defs.’ 56.1 U 13.) Plaintiff asserts that, prior 
to his arrest, Pamintuan insisted that plaintiff 
be arrested, whereas the police did not think 
an arrest was necessary over a five to ten 
dollar tube of hand sanitizer. (Pl.’s 56.1 
U 13.) Furthermore, according to the 
plaintiff, he told Egan that the defendants 
were charging him because of his HIV 
status. (Id.)
4. Plaintiff’s Suspension and Review 
Process
On July 31, 2009, while plaintiff was 
being interviewed by the police officers, 
Haffner presented plaintiff with a
4 Defendants state that the officers “viewed the 
videotape” of plaintiff opening the hand sanitizer 
dispenser, but plaintiff asserts that the officers saw 
only “two pictures from the video.” (Defs.’ 56.1 U 10, 
Pl.’s 56.1 U 10.)
4
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suspension letter, dated July 31, 2009. 
(Defs.’ 56.1 U 14, Pl.’s 56.1 U 14.) The letter 
stated that plaintiff had “displayed 
unprofessional conduct in violation o f’ the 
College’s Code of Conduct, that the matter 
would be referred to the Committee on 
Academic Policy to consider, and that while 
the process was ongoing, plaintiff was 
suspended from the College and was not 
permitted on College property.5 (Defs.’ 56.1
U 14.)
Generally, when a student was accused 
of a serious violation of the College’s Code 
of Conduct, an incident report would be 
submitted by the accuser, an investigation 
would be conducted by Student Services, 
and then a Student-Faculty Committee 
meeting would be held. (Pl.’s C.S. 56.1 
U 25.) On August 5, 2009, the College’s 
Student-Faculty Committee reviewed 
plaintiff’s case. (Defs.’ 56.1 U 15.) Plaintiff 
was not permitted to attend the August 5, 
2009 Student-Faculty Committee meeting, 
though, plaintiff contends, the College’s 
policy allowed a student to respond to the 
discipline in front of the Student-Faculty 
Committee. (Pl.’s C.S. 56.1 U 28, 30.)
The Committee consisted of students 
and faculty, and included Haffner and 
Kraszewski. (Defs.’ 56.1 U 15.) Plaintiff 
contends that Haffner voted on the 
disciplinary action, which defendants 
dispute. (Defs.’ 56.1 U 15, Pl.’s 56.1 U 15.) 
The Committee considered incident reports 
submitted to the College by Haffner and a 
member of the College maintenance staff, 
the videotape of the hand sanitizer incident,
5 The letter stated that plaintiff was “not allowed to 
attend class or be on the College campus without 
written authorization" from Haffner. “If you see the 
student in class or on campus please notify the Office 
of Student Services AND security immediately." 
(Pl.’s C.S. 56.1 U 33.)
and the July 31, 2009 suspension letter 
provided to plaintiff. (Defs.’ 56.1 U 16, Pl.’s
56.1 U 16.) According to plaintiff, no one at 
the Student-Faculty Committee Meeting 
presented plaintiff’s explanation that he had 
permission from his professor to get the 
hand sanitizer and bring it back to class. 
(Pl.’s C.S. 56.1 U 37.) The Committee 
unanimously voted to dismiss plaintiff from 
the college, with the opportunity to reapply 
after one trimester. (Defs.’ 56.1 U 16, Pl.’s
56.1 U 16.) By letter dated August 6, 2009, 
the plaintiff was informed of the 
Committee’s decision to dismiss him from 
the College and the basis for its actions. The 
letter also advised plaintiff of the process for 
applying for readmission after one trimester 
and that he was entitled to request that the 
College’s Committee on Academic Policy 
conduct a review of the Committee’s 
determination. (Defs.’ 56.1 U 17, Pl.’s 56.1 
U 17.) Plaintiff did not seek a review of the 
Committee’s decision, or to reapply after 
one trimester, though plaintiff’s 
psychotherapist called and left messages for 
Haffner to resolve the issue regarding the 
alleged theft. (Defs.’ 56.1 U 18, Pl.’s 56.1 
U 18.)
5. Incident of Alleged Theft Involving a 
Different Student
On February 23, 2009, the Old
Brookville Police came to campus after a 
student attempted to steal in excess of 
$100,000 worth of checks from the 
Financial Aid Office. (Pl.’s C.S. 56.1 U 60.) 
Pamintuan chose not to press charges. (Id.)
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action 
on July 30, 2010. Defendants moved for 
summary judgment on December 21, 2011. 
Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the
5
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motion for summary judgment on March 16, 
2012. Defendants replied on March 30, 
2012. The Court held oral argument on the 
motion on April 4, 2012. The Court has fully 
considered the arguments and submissions 
of the parties.
II. Standard of Review
The standards for summary judgment are 
well settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56(a), a court may only 
grant a motion for summary judgment if 
“the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving 
party bears the burden of showing that he or 
she is entitled to summary judgment. 
Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 69 (2d 
Cir. 2005). “A party asserting that a fact 
cannot be or is genuinely disputed must 
support the assertion by: (A) citing to 
particular parts of materials in the record, 
including depositions, documents, 
electronically stored information, affidavits 
or declarations, stipulations (including those 
made for purposes of the motion only), 
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other 
materials; or (B) showing that the materials 
cited do not establish the absence or 
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an 
adverse party cannot produce admissible 
evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(c)(1). The court “is not to weigh the 
evidence but is instead required to view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment, to draw 
all reasonable inferences in favor of that 
party, and to eschew credibility 
assessments.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. 
Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 854 
(2d Cir. 1996)); see Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct.
2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986) (summary 
judgment is unwarranted if “the evidence is 
such that a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the nonmoving party”).
Once the moving party has met its 
burden, the opposing party “‘must do more 
than simply show that there is some 
metaphysical doubt as to the material 
facts . . . . [T]he nonmoving party must 
come forward with specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” 
Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 
(2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 
574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 
538 (1986) (emphasis in original)). As the 
Supreme Court stated in Anderson, “[i]f the 
evidence is merely colorable, or is not 
significantly probative, summary judgment 
may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 
249-50, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (citations omitted). 
Indeed, “the mere existence of some alleged 
factual dispute between the parties” alone 
will not defeat a properly supported motion 
for summary judgment. Id. at 247-48, 106 
S. Ct. 2505 (emphasis in original). Thus, the 
nonmoving party may not rest upon mere 
conclusory allegations or denials but must 
set forth “‘concrete particulars'” showing 
that a trial is needed. R.G. Group, Inc. v. 
Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 77 (2d 
Cir.1984) (quoting SEC v. Research 
Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 
1978)). Accordingly, it is insufficient for a 
party opposing summary judgment “‘merely 
to assert a conclusion without supplying 
supporting arguments or facts.’” BellSouth 
Telecomms., Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 77 
F.3d 603, 615 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting 
Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d at 
33).
6
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The Second Circuit has provided 
additional guidance regarding summary 
judgment motions in discrimination cases:
We have sometimes noted that an 
extra measure of caution is merited in 
affirming summary judgment in a 
discrimination action because direct 
evidence of discriminatory intent is 
rare and such intent often must be 
inferred from circumstantial evidence 
found in affidavits and depositions.
See, e.g., Gallo v. Prudential 
Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219, 
1224 (2d Cir. 1994). Nonetheless, 
“summary judgment remains 
available for the dismissal of 
discrimination claims in cases lacking 
genuine issues of material fact.” 
McLee v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 
130, 135 (2d Cir. 1997); see also 
Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
239 F.3d 456, 466 (2d Cir. 2001) (“It 
is now beyond cavil that summary 
judgment may be appropriate even in 
the fact-intensive context of 
discrimination cases.”).
Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., 445 F.3d 
597, 603 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Holtz v. 




The ADA was enacted by Congress to 
“provide a clear and comprehensive national 
mandate for the elimination of 
discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities^]” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). 
Title I of the ADA prohibits employment 
discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112. Title 
II prohibits disability discrimination by
public entities in connection with access to 
public services. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
Under Title III, the provision at issue, “[n]o 
individual shall be discriminated against on 
the basis of disability in the full and equal 
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations 
of any place of public accommodation by 
any person who owns, leases (or leases to), 
or operates a place of public
accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182. The 
statute provides a list of private entities that 
are defined as places of public
accommodation, including, for example, 
hotels, theaters, grocery stores, and 
transportation centers. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). 
Schools, including “elementary, secondary, 
undergraduate, or postgraduate private
school[s], or other place[s] of education” are 
defined as places of public accommodation. 
42 U.S.C. § 12181 (7)(J).
In order to establish a prima facie case 
under Title III of the ADA, a plaintiff must 
establish the following: (1) that he is 
disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) 
that defendants own, lease, or operate a 
place of public accommodation; and (3) that 
defendants discriminated against the 
plaintiff by denying him a full and equal 
opportunity to enjoy the services defendants 
provide. See Roberts v. Royal Atl. Corp., 
542 F.3d 363, 368 (2d Cir. 2008); Camarillo 
v. Carrols Corp., 518 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 
2008).6
6 Plaintiff concedes that he failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies before filing this action. 
Accordingly, his claims for employment 
discrimination pursuant to Title I of the ADA, 42 
U.S.C. § 12112, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 794, are dismissed. Instead, plaintiff brings 
his claim of discrimination in public accommodation 
under Title III, which does not require administrative 
exhaustion. See McInerney v. Rensselaer Polytechnic
7
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B. Whether Plaintiff is Disabled
A threshold issue is whether plaintiff 
sufficiently alleges that he was disabled 
within the meaning of the ADA. For the 
reasons set forth below, this Court concludes 
that plaintiff has raised a genuine dispute as 
to material facts concerning whether he is 
disabled under the ADA.
The ADA defines a disability as “(A) a 
physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life 
activities of such individual; (B) a record of 
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded 
as having such an impairment (as described 
in paragraph (3)).” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). 
With respect to an individual who is 
“regarded as having an impairment” under 
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C), the individual 
must establish “that he or she has been 
subjected to an action prohibited under this 
Act because of an actual or perceived 
physical or mental impairment whether or 
not the impairment limits or is perceived to
Inst., 505 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2007). It is well- 
settled that the the three-part burden-shifting analysis 
set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 
(1973) (“McDonnell Douglas’’) applies to
employment discrimination cases brought under Title 
I of the ADA. In the motion papers in this case, both 
sides utilize the McDonnell Douglas framework to 
analyze the Title III discrimination claim. (See Defs.’ 
Mot. for Summary Judgment (“Defs.’ Mot.”) at 14­
15, Dec. 21, 2011, ECF No. 30; Pl.’s Opp. to the 
Mot. for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Opp.”) at 20-21, 
Mar. 16, 2012, ECF No. 35.) Although the Second 
Circuit has never decided whether McDonnell 
Douglas should also be utilized for Title III claims, 
this Court concludes that, given the nature of the 
claims in this case (namely, termination from a work- 
study position, and suspension and dismissal from the 
College because of a disability), and given that the 
parties both apply the framework, it is appropriate to 
use the framework here. In any event, the Court’s 
decision would be the same even without utilization 
of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
limit a major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(3)(A). However, paragraph (1)(C) 
“shall not apply to impairments that are 
transitory and minor. A transitory 
impairment is an impairment with an actual 
or expected duration of 6 months or less.” 
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B).
Congress enacted the ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), effective January 
1, 2009, which expanded the class of 
individuals entitled to protection under the 
ADA. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(2008). As the Ninth Circuit has explained:
In the ADAAA, Congress 
emphasizes that when it enacted the 
ADA in 1990, it “intended that the 
Act ‘provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for 
the elimination of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities’ 
and provide broad coverage.” The 
ADAAA rejects the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the term “disability” 
in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 144 
L. Ed. 2d 450 (1999), and Toyota 
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. 
v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 122 S. Ct.
681, 151 L. Ed. 2d 615 (2002), and 
thereby expands the class of 
individuals who are entitled to 
protection under the ADA.
Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. 
Improvement & Power Dist, 555 F.3d 850, 
853 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
The ADAAA clarified the definition of 
“major life activities” in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(1)(A). Specifically, as relevant to 
this case, post-ADAAA, “a major life 
activity also includes the operation of a 
major bodily function, including but not
8
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limited to, functions of the immune system.” 
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B). Furthermore, 
“[a]n impairment that is episodic or in 
remission is a disability if it would 
substantially limit a major life activity when 
active.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D). 
Additionally, one of Congress’s purposes in 
enacting the ADAAA was “to convey that 
the question of whether an individual’s 
impairment is a disability under the ADA 
should not demand extensive analysis.” 122 
Stat. 3554.
Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to plaintiff, including drawing all 
reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor, a 
rational factfinder could conceivably 
conclude that plaintiff’s HIV-positive status 
substantially limits the major life activity of 
the function of his immune system.
7 Prior to the passage of the ADAAA, in Bragdon v. 
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998), the Supreme Court 
held that the respondent’s HIV infection was a 
disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) because it 
“substantially limits [the] major life activity” of 
reproduction. The Court did not address whether HIV 
infection is a per se disability under the ADA. Id. at 
642. In Teachout v. N.Y. City Dep’t o f Educ., 04 Civ. 
945 (GEL), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7405 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 27, 2006), plaintiff claimed that his HIV­
positive status substantially limited the major life 
activity of reproduction. Id. at *23. Because HIV has 
not been held to be a disability per se, the court 
undertook a “case-by-case inquiry as to whether a 
plaintiff’s HIV infection substantially affects 
plaintiff's ability to reproduce.” Id. at *23-24 
(emphasis in original). The court concluded that 
plaintiff’s ability to reproduce was substantially 
limited by his HIV-positive status, since the record 
contained no evidence that plaintiff had any other 
condition limiting his ability to reproduce, and 
plaintiff’s partner had submitted an affidavit stating 
that they “began to talk about having a child.” Id. at 
*27. That statement and the lack of evidence pointing 
to any alternative inability to reproduce was 
sufficient to “create an issue of fact regarding the 
[effect of plaintiff’s HIV infection on the major life 
activity of reproduction.” Id. Similarly, in Lederer v. 
BP Prods. N. Am., 04 Civ. 9664, 2006 U.S. Dist.
Plaintiff was diagnosed as HIV-positive 
several years before enrolling in the College. 
(Pl.’s Ex. A, Plaintiff’s Deposition (“Pl.’s 
Dep.”), 118:16-18.) The record in this case 
contains evidence that plaintiff suffered 
from various ailments during his time at the 
College. For example, plaintiff experienced 
a Staph infection that began at the end of 
May and lasted until early June 2009, which
caused him to go to the emergency room and8to miss several classes. (Defs.’ 56.1 ^ 6.) 
Plaintiff also testified that he broke his ribs 
at one point while he was a student at the 
College, and that he told Keohane that it will 
“take a little longer for me to heal because I 
do have HIV.” (Pl.’s Dep. at 137:23-25.) *8
LEXIS 87368, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2006), the 
court found that the HIV-positive plaintiff had raised 
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether HIV 
substantially limited his ability to reproduce to 
preclude summary judgment on the issue of whether 
plaintiff was disabled for purposes of the ADA. In 
the instant action, however, plaintiff has not alleged 
that his HIV status affected his ability to reproduce, 
and the Court’s conclusion concerning whether 
plaintiff is disabled is premised on plaintiff’s 
assertions concerning his immune system, not on 
whether plaintiff’s ability to reproduce was impaired.
8 Plaintiff may also have experienced Staph 
infections in April 2009 and October 2009. (Pl.’s Ex. 
II, Budney Deposition (“Budney Dep.”), at ECF Page
No. 112-13.) Furthermore, plaintiff’s psychotherapist 
was questioned concerning plaintiff’s health as a 
consequence of his HIV-positive status. “I am not an 
expert on stress affected to HIV illness, but in my 
opinion and my experience with [plaintiff], when he 
is going through a lot of stress it impacts him 
physically. He gets diarrhea or he gets sick or . . . he 
will have headaches, he won’t be able to sleep.” (Id.) 
She noted, however, that she did not speak to any 
medical doctors about “what impact, if any, the stress 
was having on his HIV status.” (Id. at 113.) She 
opined that the chronic stress may have played a role 
in plaintiff’s hospitalization for a severe Staph 
infection on October 6, 2009. (Id.) She also stated, 
“when he is under a lot of stress and strain or when 
his interpersonal life is not going well, it would lower 
his immune system or he might tend to get more sick, 
physically sick.” (Id.)
9
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Finally, plaintiff testified that he told 
Kraszewski about his HIV status after he 
had missed class because he wasn’t “feeling 
well,” and had learned that his T-cell “levels 
had dropped” and he was “becoming ill with 
the HIV infection,” which meant that he 
would need to start a treatment regimen. 
(Pl.’s Dep. at 142:9-18.)
This evidence concerning plaintiff’s 
hospitalizations due to Staph infections, 
plaintiff’s difficulty recovering from 
injuries, and plaintiff’s T-cell levels is 
sufficient to create a disputed issue of fact as 
to whether plaintiff is disabled within the 
meaning of the ADA. See Horgan v. 
Simmons, No. 09 C 6796, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 36915, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 
2010) (“Drawing all inferences in 
Plaintiff[’]s favor, it is certainly plausible -  
particularly, under the amended ADA -  that 
Plaintiff’s HIV-positive status substantially 
limits a major life activity: the function of 
his immune system.”); cf. Baptista v. 
Hartford Bd. of Educ., 427 F. App’x 39, 42 
(2d Cir. 2011) (“But while [appellant] 
conclusorily alleges that his firing 
constituted discrimination on the basis of his 
alcoholism or HIV-positive status, in none 
of his complaints did he describe how either 
impairment limited any major life 
activity.”).9 In other words, a rational
9 The Court notes that this conclusion -  namely, that 
there is sufficient evidence in the record from which 
a rational factfinder could conclude that the function 
of plaintiff’s immune system may have been 
substantially limited by his HIV status -  is consistent 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission regulations to implement the equal 
employment provisions of the ADA, which state, “it 
should easily be concluded that the following types 
of impairments will, at a minimum, substantially 
limit the major life activities indicated: . . . Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infection 
substantially limits immune function.” 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2.
factfinder, construing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to plaintiff, could 
conclude that plaintiff’ s HIV-positive status 
constituted a disability because it 
substantially limited the major life activity 
of the function of his immune system. See 
42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A), 12102(2)(B).10
C. Whether Arrest and Dismissal Were 
“Because of” Disability
Defendants argue that Pamintuan and 
Virasawmi had no knowledge of plaintiff’s 
HIV-positive status at the time of plaintiff’s 
dismissal, and that there is no evidence from 
which it could be reasonably inferred that 
the defendants took the adverse actions 
“because o f’ plaintiff’s HIV-positive status. 
(Defs.’ Mot. at 15.) This Court concludes, 
however, that a rational factfinder could find 
that the individuals responsible for the 
adverse actions against plaintiff were aware 
of his HIV-positive status.
According to plaintiff’ s evidence, in 
early June 2009, plaintiff disclosed that he 
was HIV-positive to Kraszewski,11 the 
Director of Student Services, and to Haffner, 
then the Dean of Students and a professor. 
(Defs.’ 56.1 ^ 6.) Plaintiff also disclosed his 
HIV-positive status to Keohane, either in
10 Additionally, there is a disputed issue of material 
fact as to whether plaintiff was “regarded as” 
disabled under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C). As 
discussed infra, construing all facts in the plaintiffs 
favor, plaintiff’s supervisors treated him differently 
after learning that he had a Staph infection and after 
he advised them of his HIV status. A rational 
factfinder could conclude that their actions 
demonstrate that they believed plaintiff was 
significantly impaired, such that he was regarded by 
them as disabled (as that term is defined under the 
ADA).
11 Kraszewski does not recall plaintiff disclosing his 
HIV-positive status to her. (Defs. ’ Ex. N, Kraszewski 
Deposition (“Kraszewski Dep.”), 57:24-58:17.)
10
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June 2009, (Defs.’ 56.1 ^ 6.), or two to three 
months prior to June 2009 (Pl.’s 56.1 ^ 6.). 
Additionally, plaintiff disclosed to 
Alexander, his supervisor in the Office of 
Admissions, that he was HIV-positive after 
he returned from a two-week absence for the 
Staph infection. (Pl.’s C.S. 56.1 ^ 88.)
One week after plaintiff disclosed to 
Alexander and Haffner that he was HIV­
positive, Rodas, the Director of Admissions, 
began slamming the door to her office while 
plaintiff was working in the office, began 
checking plaintiff’s work-study hours, and 
made plaintiff sign a piece of paper saying 
he would not work in excess of ten hours. 
(Id. ^ 93.) According to plaintiff, plaintiff 
had previously been permitted to work as 
many hours as he wanted to. (Pl.’s Dep. 
122:7-15, 151:21-24.)
Plaintiff also asserts, under oath, the 
following: (1) after plaintiff disclosed his
HIV status to Haffner, on at least two or 
three occasions, plaintiff observed Haffner, 
Pamintuan, and Virasawmi clustered 
together making comments directed at 
plaintiff (Pl.’s C.S. 56.1 ^ 98); (2)
Pamintuan’s secretary also treated plaintiff 
very coldly and closed the office door on 
plaintiff when plaintiff went to give 
Pamintuan paperwork (Id. ^ 101); (3)
Pamintuan gave plaintiff unpleasant looks 
when plaintiff dropped off paperwork (Id. 
^ 102); and (4) Haffner’s demeanor changed 
after plaintiff disclosed his HIV status, 
becoming very cold and avoiding speaking 
to plaintiff. (Id. ^ 103.)12
12 Pamintuan states in her declaration that the first 
time she became aware of the claim of discrimination 
based on HIV status by plaintiff was when a local 
newscaster attempted to contact her for a comment 
regarding plaintiffs claims. (Defs.’ 56.1  ^ 19, Pl.’s 
56.1 H 19.)
This evidence is sufficient to create a 
disputed issue of material fact as to whether 
Pamintuan and Virasawmi were aware of 
plaintiff’s HIV-positive status and engaged 
in the adverse actions against him because 
of that status.
D. Whether Plaintiff Has Shown 
Defendants’ Explanation to be Pretextual
Plaintiff argues that he has met his 
burden to show that defendants’ proffered 
reason for having him arrested, suspended, 
and dismissed was pretextual. The Court 
concludes that there are genuine issues of 
material fact in dispute concerning whether 
defendants’ explanation was a pretext for 
disability discrimination.
Defendants argue that the reason for 
plaintiff’s arrest and suspension is that he 
was observed on videotape stealing hand 
sanitizer. According to defendants, when 
plaintiff was given the opportunity to 
explain his actions, he admitted to taking the 
cartridge. Moreover, defendants contend that 
plaintiff never told the defendants that he 
had permission from Keohane to take the 
hand sanitizer, and in fact, only offered that 
explanation when he was taken to the police 
station. Indeed, Keohane denies giving the 
plaintiff permission to break open the 
sanitizer cartridge. Additionally, plaintiff 
never appealed the College Committee’s 
decision, and never informed the College of 
his belief that he had been treated in a 
discriminatory manner.
In an effort to show pretext, plaintiff 
points, in part, to the defendants’ alleged 
failure to give him a sufficient opportunity 
to respond to the allegations against him, as 
well as defendants’ failure to thoroughly 
investigate the incident. For example, 
Keohane, at his deposition, confirmed that
11
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plaintiff was sharing the hand sanitizer with 
students in the class. (Keohane Dep. 62:7­
13.) However, there is no evidence that 
anyone consulted with Keohane before 
suspending plaintiff. On those issues, the 
Court emphasizes that a person’s 
disagreement with the thoroughness of an 
investigation is not, in and of itself, 
sufficient to demonstrate discriminatory 
intent. See Rorie v. United Parcel Serv., 
Inc., 151 F.3d 757, 761 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(stating that “the relevant inquiry was 
whether [plaintiff] created a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether her discharge 
was gender-based and not whether her 
termination was reasonable” and noting that 
“[i]t is not the task of this court to determine 
whether [the investigator’s] investigation 
was sufficiently thorough or fair”); Sharpe 
v. UticaMut. Ins. Co., 756 F. Supp. 2d 230, 
250 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Rodriguez v. 
City of N.Y., 644 F. Supp. 2d 168, 187 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[T]he fact that an 
employee disagrees with the results of an 
employer’s decision regarding termination, 
or even has evidence that the decision was 
objectively incorrect or was based on faulty 
investigation, does not automatically 
demonstrate, by itself, that the employer’s 
proffered reasons are a pretext for 
termination.”)). However, plaintiff points to 
other categories of actions, that, when 
viewed collectively in the light most 
favorable to plaintiff, raise a genuine 
disputed issue of fact as to whether 
defendants’ actions were pretextual.
As discussed above, one week after 
plaintiff disclosed his HIV-positive status to 
Haffner and Alexander, plaintiff’s 
supervisor Rodas allegedly began slamming 
the door to her office while plaintiff was 
working in the office. (Pl.’s C.S. 56.1 ^ 93.) 
Plaintiff also observed Haffner, Pamintuan, 
and Virasawmi allegedly clustered together
making comments directed at plaintiff. (Id. 
^ 98.) Pamintuan’s secretary allegedly 
treated plaintiff very coldly and closed the 
office door on plaintiff when plaintiff went 
to give Pamintuan paperwork. (Id. ^ 101.) 
Pamintuan allegedly gave plaintiff 
unpleasant looks when plaintiff dropped off 
paperwork. (Id. ^ 102.) Haffner’s demeanor 
also allegedly changed after plaintiff 
disclosed his HIV status, becoming very 
cold and avoiding speaking to plaintiff. (Id.
If 103.)
Additionally, according to plaintiff, 
Rodas began checking plaintiff’s work-study 
hours, and made plaintiff sign a piece of 
paper saying he would not work in excess of 
ten hours. (Id. ^ 93.) Plaintiff testified that, 
previously, plaintiff had been permitted to 
work as many hours as he wanted to. (Pl.’s 
Dep. 122:7-15, 151:21-24.) Plaintiff
acknowledges that the Financial Aid 
Director, Luis Gauman, told plaintiff two 
weeks after plaintiff started working, that 
there was a limit on hours, but “he 
[Gauman] said don’t worry about it.” (Id. 
152:2-6.) Although plaintiff had signed a 
Federal Work-Study Contract limiting his 
hours to 20 hours per week, he said the rule 
was not enforced. (Id. 152:13-21, 153:11­
14.) Indeed, in a nine-day period from June 
30 to July 9, 2009, plaintiff worked 53 
hours, which plaintiff testified was typical of 
the number of hours he worked. (Id. 156:16­
157:6.) After plaintiff revealed his HIV­
positive status, the Office of Admissions 
limited his hours to ten per week. (Pl.’s C.S. 
56.1 ^ 10.) At oral argument, the Court 
asked defendants for an explanation 
concerning the sharp reduction in plaintiff’s 
hours, and defendants responded that the 
College was merely enforcing the 20-hour 
maximum mandated for participants in the 
Federal Work-Study program. Defendants 
did not, however, provide any explanation
12
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contained in the record for why that limit 
was not enforced prior to plaintiff’s 
disclosure of his HIV-positive status.
Moreover, plaintiff has proffered 
evidence that a student who was not HIV­
positive and who attempted to steal items 
from the College was treated differently than 
plaintiff. Specifically, on February 23, 2009, 
the Old Brookville Police came to campus 
after a student attempted to steal in excess of 
$100,000 worth of checks from the 
Financial Aid Office. (Id. ^ 60.) Unlike in 
plaintiff’s case, Pamintuan chose not to 
press charges. (Id.) Defendants argue that 
plaintiff was not similarly situated to the 
other student because “it involved a student 
who lost his temper in the Financial Aid 
Office, picked up a stack of checks and had 
to be physically restrained by a College 
employee.” (Defs.’ Reply in Support of 
Mot. for Summary Judgment (“Defs.’ 
Reply”) at 10, Mar. 30, 2012, ECF No. 37.) 
Defendants further contend that, prior to 
plaintiff’s alleged theft, there was “a long 
string of thefts that had been plaguing the 
campus for an extended period.” (Id.) 
However, the Court concludes that, in this 
case, the fact-specific question of whether 
these students were similarly situated, and 
whether the differing treatment supports a 
reasonable inference of disability 
discrimination, cannot be decided on 
summary judgment and should be left to the 
jury. See generally Graham v. Long Island 
R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(“Whether two employees are similarly 
situated ordinarily presents a question of fact 
for the jury.”); accord Lizardo v. Denny’s, 
Inc., 270 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (same).
Thus, plaintiff asserts, inter alia, that: 
(1) College employees’ attitudes towards the 
plaintiff changed significantly after he 
disclosed his HIV-positive status; (2)
plaintiff’ s supervisors began enforcing a 
limit on plaintiff’s hours after he disclosed 
his HIV-positive status, whereas he had 
previously been permitted to work unlimited 
hours; and (3) the College did not arrest a 
non-HIV-positive student who attempted a 
serious theft on campus. Drawing all 
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’ s favor, 
these assertions, collectively, are sufficient 
to create an issue of disputed fact as to 
whether defendants’ actions were the result 
of plaintiff’ s disability or perceived 
disability. Accordingly, the Court denies 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment 
on the claim under Title III of the ADA, 42 
U.S.C. § 12182 and the claim under the 
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794.13
Finally, the Court denies defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment with respect 
to certain categories of damages -  namely, 
front pay, reinstatement, a degree from the 
College, or lost wages. Defendants argue 
that plaintiff cannot obtain these forms of 
relief because of “after acquired evidence” 
which defendants contend demonstrates,
13 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that 
“[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability 
in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her 
or his disability, be excluded from the participation 
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 794(a). Apart from some subtle differences 
between the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act that are 
not dispositive here, “the reach and requirements of 
both statutes are precisely the same.” Weixel v. Bd. o f 
Educ. ofN.Y., 287 F.3d 138, 146 n.5 (2d Cir. 2002); 
see Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 291 
(2d Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the Court denies 
summary judgment on the claim of discrimination in 
public accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act 
for the same reasons that the Court denies summary 
judgment on the ADA claim. Similarly, the Court 
also denies summary judgment on the N.Y. Exec. 
Law § 296 claim for the same reasons that the Court 
denies summary judgment on the ADA claim.
13
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inter alia, that plaintiff made false 
statements to the College about his 
educational background and submitted false 
billing for student work. However, plaintiff 
disputes much of this evidence, including 
denying that he made statements about 
attending Mercy College and denying that 
he falsely billed hours. (Pl.’s 56.1 ^  2, 5.)14 
In any event, it is unclear from the record 
exactly how each of these pieces of 
evidence, even if proven, would have 
impacted plaintiff’s eligibility for admission 
or continuing enrollment at the College.15 
The Court concludes, given the factual 
disputes surrounding the after acquired 
evidence and the disputes about its potential 
impact on plaintiff’s attendance at the 
College, that these damages issues also 
cannot be resolved on summary judgment. 
See, e.g., Smith v. Tuckahoe Union Free 
Sch. Dist, No. 03 Civ. 7951 (PGG), 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91106, at *39 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 30, 2009) (“Summary judgment on this 
issue [of after acquired evidence] ‘is 
inappropriate’ where the plaintiff ‘raise[s] a 
material issue of fact as to whether the after­
acquired evidence would actually be a basis 
for termination.’” (quoting Greene v. Coach, 
Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 404, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002))); see also Flores v. Buy, Buy Baby, 
Inc., 118 F. Supp. 2d 425, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (“There remain material issues of 
relevant fact as to whether [the employer] 
would have fired [the plaintiff] solely on the 
basis of her falsified employment
14 Plaintiff also asserts, “Tellingly, Defendants did 
not make any accusations regarding alleged issues 
with Plaintiff’s Work-Study time sheets for over a 
year after his arrest until at least August 2, 2010, after 
the criminal case had been dismissed in favor of 
[Plaintiff].” (Pl.’s Opp. at 5 n.1.)
15 For example, with respect to the issue with 
plaintiff’s high school diploma, it is unclear whether 
it could have been corrected while plaintiff continued 
to attend classes at the College.
application. Defendant’s motion to strike 
plaintiff’s claim for front pay and 
reinstatement is therefore denied.”).
E. State Law Claims
1. False Arrest and False Imprisonment
Plaintiff’s claims for false arrest and 
false imprisonment fail because defendants, 
as private individuals and entities, cannot be 
held liable for plaintiff’s arrest by the 
Village of Old Brookville police officers 
because the officers had probable cause to 
arrest plaintiff for petit larceny, and there is 
no allegation that defendants knowingly 
provided false information to the police 
concerning plaintiff’ s actions.
The Second Circuit has established that 
“[t]he existence of probable cause to arrest 
constitutes justification and ‘is a complete 
defense to an action for false arrest.’” 
Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 
1996) (quoting Bernard v. United States, 25
F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994)). “In general, 
probable cause to arrest exists when the 
officers have knowledge or reasonably 
trustworthy information of facts and 
circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a 
person of reasonable caution in the belief 
that the person to be arrested has committed 
or is committing a crime.” Id. Furthermore, 
“[t]he validity of an arrest does not depend 
upon an ultimate finding of guilt or 
innocence.” Peterson v. Cnty. of Nassau, 
995 F. Supp. 305, 313 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) 
(citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 
(1967)). “Rather, the court looks only to the 
information the arresting officer had at the 
time of the arrest.” Id. (citing Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)). 
Moreover, the “question of whether or not 
probable cause existed may be determinable 
as a matter of law if there is no dispute as to
14
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the pertinent events and the knowledge of 
the officers.” Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852.
The arresting officer, Sergeant Egan, 
“thought we had enough for an arrest at that 
time.” (Egan Dep. 46:8-9.) He viewed 
surveillance pictures showing plaintiff 
taking the hand sanitizer. (Id. 24:23-25:8.) 
When Egan asked plaintiff what happened, 
plaintiff “really didn’t reply.” (Id. 25:14-15.) 
Egan also spoke to Virasawmi, who said that 
the plaintiff did not have permission to take 
the hand sanitizer. (Id. 28:17-24, 45:19-21). 
There is no allegation that Virasawmi knew 
or believed that plaintiff had permission to 
take the sanitizer, thus plaintiff does not 
allege that Virasawmi knowingly provided 
false information to the police. Instead, 
plaintiff suggests that Virasawmi failed to 
conduct a thorough investigation by, among 
other things, checking with Keohane to 
verify the plaintiff’s version of events. (See 
Pl.’s Opp. at 7 (“[N]either the police nor 
Defendants Virasawmi or Haffner sought 
Dr. Keohane or any students who had been 
in the class room on July 30, 2009, to verify 
Plaintiff’s version of events.”).) However, 
the mere failure to investigate does not 
provide a basis for false arrest, whether the 
failure to investigate is on the part of the 
police or, as in this case, on a private 
individual allegedly acting in concert with 
the police by providing information to the 
police. See Ricciuti v. N.Y. City Transit 
Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(“Once a police officer has a reasonable 
basis for believing there is probable cause, 
he is not required to explore or eliminate 
every theoretically plausible claim of 
innocence before making an arrest.”); see 
also Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 
65, 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Although a better 
procedure may have been for the officers to 
investigate plaintiff’s version of events more 
completely, the arresting officer does not
have to prove plaintiff’s version wrong 
before arresting him.”); compare Weintraub 
v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 423 F. Supp. 2d 38, 
55-56 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (denying summary 
judgment where “[plaintiff] complain[ed] 
that the defendants instigated the arrest, and 
did so based on facts that they knew were 
false.”). In short, given that there is no 
allegation or evidence that any of the named 
defendants knew that the information being 
provided to the police was false, and given 
that the evidence supplied to the police 
(including the surveillance photographs) was 
sufficient to establish probable cause for the 
theft, the false arrest and false imprisonment 
claims fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, 
the Court grants summary judgment to 
defendants on plaintiff’s false arrest and 
false imprisonment claims.16
2. Breach of Contract
Plaintiff alleges that defendants breached 
a contract with plaintiff by depriving him of 
an opportunity to address the circumstances 
surrounding his theft before the Student- 
Faculty Committee and by failing to provide 
him with a hearing before the Committee on 
Academic Policy. This claim must fail.
16 Plaintiff additionally alleges negligence against 
defendants Pamintuan, Virasawmi, and Haffner for 
“carelessly and recklessly” procuring plaintiff’s 
arrest, seizure, and detention. (Complaint If 106, July 
30, 2010, ECF No. 1.) Thus, plaintiff seeks damages 
for injury resulting from his allegedly false arrest and 
detention. It is well-settled under New York law that, 
where a plaintiff seeks damages for “injury resulting 
from false arrest and detention,” he “cannot recover 
under broad general principles of negligence but, 
instead, must proceed by way of the traditional 
remedy of false arrest.” Santoro v. Town o f 
Smithtown, 40 A.D.3d 736, 738 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2007). Accordingly, the Court grants summary 
judgment to defendants on plaintiff’s negligence 
claim.
15
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“The elements of a breach of contract 
claim in New York are: (1) the existence of 
a contract, (2) performance by the party 
seeking recovery, (3) non-performance by 
the other party, and (4) damages attributable 
to the breach.” Kramer v. New York City Bd. 
of Educ., 715 F. Supp. 2d 335, 356 
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting RCN Telecom 
Servs., Inc. v. 202 Centre St. Realty LLC., 
156 F. App’x 349, 350-51 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
The defendants’ handbook did not provide 
any “right” to a hearing before the Student- 
Faculty Committee. (Defs.’ Ex. X, New 
York College of Health Professions, Student 
Handbook, Spring 2009.) The handbook is 
silent on that issue. In any event, it is 
uncontroverted that defendants did, in fact, 
provide plaintiff with an opportunity to 
contest the charges against him by allowing 
him to request that the College’s Committee 
on Academic Policy review the decision of 
the Student-Faculty Committee, but plaintiff 
did not avail himself of this opportunity. 
(Defs.’ Ex. Y, Letter from Kraszewski to Pl., 
Aug. 6, 2009.) Thus, given the
uncontroverted evidence, no rational jury 
could conclude (1) that there was a contract, 
or (2) that there was non-performance by the 
defendants under any alleged contract. 
Accordingly, the Court grants summary 
judgment to defendants on the breach of 
contract claim.17
17 Additionally, plaintiff argues that defendants have 
breached a contract with plaintiff by violating anti­
discrimination provisions in the Student Handbook. 
(Pl.’s Opp. at 22.) This claim fails because “it is well- 
established that an employer’s anti-discrimination 
policies and manuals cannot serve as the basis for a 
breach of contract claim.” Price v. Cushman & 
Wakefield, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 670, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (quotations omitted) (collecting cases).
3. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
A claim of negligent infliction of 
emotional distress “may only proceed where 
the allegations of conduct are ‘so extreme in 
degree and outrageous in character as to go 
beyond all possible bounds of decency, so as 
to be regarded as atrocious and utterly 
intolerable in a civilized community.’” 
Wilson v. City of New York, 294 A.D.2d 
290, 295, 743 N.Y.S.2d 30, 34 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2002) (quoting Wolkstein v. 
Morgenstern, 275 A.D.2d 635, 636-37, 713 
N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) 
(internal quotations omitted)). Moreover, 
“‘[i]n the absence of contemporaneous or 
consequential physical injury, courts have 
been reluctant to permit recovery for 
negligently caused psychological trauma, 
with ensuing emotional harm alone.’” 
Armstrong v. Brookdale Univ. Hosp. & Med. 
Ctr., 425 F.3d 126, 137 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(quoting Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 
381, 334 N.E.2d 590, 592, 372 N.Y.S.2d 
638, 641 (1975)).
[Although] physical injury is no 
longer a necessary component of a 
cause of action to recover damages 
for the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress . . . [t]he
circumstances under which recovery 
may be had for purely emotional 
harm are extremely limited and, thus, 
a cause of action seeking such 
recovery must generally be premised 
upon a breach of a duty owed 
directly to the plaintiff which either 
endangered the plaintiff’s physical 
safety or caused the plaintiff fear for 
his or her own physical safety.
Lancellotti v. Howard, 155 A.D.2d 588, 547 
N.Y.S.2d 654, 655 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989) (internal citations omitted). In the
16
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instant case, plaintiff has not pointed to any 
evidence in the record, nor has the Court 
found any evidence from which plaintiff 
could establish that he suffered an emotional 
injury as a result of a breach of duty owed 
directly to him that endangered his physical 
safety. Accordingly, the Court grants 
summary judgment to defendants on 
plaintiff’s claim of negligent infliction of 
emotional distress.
4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress18
In order to assert a valid claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress 
(“IIED”) under New York law, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate “(1) extreme and 
outrageous conduct, (2) intent to cause 
severe emotional distress, (3) a causal 
connection between the conduct and the 
injury, and (4) severe emotional distress.” 
Bender v. City of N.Y., 78 F.3d 787, 790 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (citing Howell v. N. Y. Post Co., 
81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 612 N.E.2d 699, 702, 
596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 353 (1993)). “New York 
sets a high threshold for conduct that is 
‘extreme and outrageous’ enough to 
constitute intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.” Id. (citation omitted). The conduct 
alleged must be “‘so outrageous in 
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go 
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and 
to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly 
intolerable in a civilized society.’” Martin v. 
Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 220 (2d Cir. 
1985) (quoting Fischer v. Maloney, 43 
N.Y.2d 553, 557, 373 N.E.2d 1215, 1217,
18 In his opposition papers, plaintiff does not 
specifically address defendants’ arguments regarding 
the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 
and, thus, it could be deemed abandoned. However, 
in an abundance of caution, the Court has analyzed 
the merits of the claim and, in any event, concludes 
that it cannot survive summary judgment.
402 N.Y.S.2d 991, 993 (1978)). “New York 
courts do not allow IIED claims where ‘the 
conduct complained of falls well within the 
ambit of other traditional tort liability.’” 
McGrath v. Nassau Health Care Corp., 217 
F. Supp. 2d 319, 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(quoting Lian v. Sedgwick James, Inc., 992 
F. Supp. 644, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)). As a 
result, “IIED claims that are duplicative of 
other tort claims should therefore be 
dismissed.” Id. (citing Lian, 992 F. Supp. at 
651). Moreover, “New York courts have 
been very strict in applying these 
principles.” Martin, 762 F.2d at 220; see 
also Elmowitz v. Executive Towers at Lido, 
LLC, 571 F. Supp. 2d 370, 378 (E.D.N.Y. 
2008) (“Very few claims satisfy the extreme 
and outrageous requirement of a IIED claim. 
In fact, none of the IIED claims considered 
by the New York Court of Appeals have 
survived because the conduct was not 
sufficiently outrageous.” (citation omitted)).
Even assuming that all of plaintiff’s 
evidence is true, the alleged conduct is not 
so outrageous in character and so extreme in 
degree as to go beyond all possible bounds 
of decency. See Martin, 762 F.2d at 220 
(even if plaintiff had established that she 
was polygraphed by her employer as a result 
of racial discrimination, such acts “would 
not provide legally adequate grounds for a 
verdict of IIED”); Murphy v. Am. Home 
Products Corp, 58 N.Y.2d 293, 303, 448 
N.E.2d 86, 90, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 236 
(1983) (affirming dismissal of a claim as 
“fall[ing] far short of [IIED’s] strict 
standard” that alleged that plaintiff was 
transferred and demoted for reporting fraud 
at his company, then discharged in a 
humiliating manner); Ruggiero v. 
Contemporary Shells, Inc, 160 A.D.2d 986, 
987, 554 N.Y.S.2d 708, 708 (N.Y. App Div. 
1990) (dismissing claim where the 
defendant allegedly “harassed and ultimately
17
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discharged the plaintiff due to her 
pregnancy”). Accordingly, the Court grants 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment 
on the claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.19
19 Plaintiff’s claim of respondeat superior liability 
against the College for the tortious acts of its 
employees Pamintuan, Virasawmi, and Haffner is 
derivative of plaintiff’s state law claims for false 
arrest, false imprisonment, and intentional and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Because the 
Court grants summary judgment on each of those 
underlying tort claims against the individual 
defendants, the Court also grants summary judgment 
to defendants on the respondeat superior claim. 
Additionally, the Court grants summary judgment to 
defendants on plaintiff’s claims under Sections 6, 11, 
and 12 of Article I of the New York State 
Constitution. Sections 6 and 12 concern the right to 
be free from certain actions by New York State, not 
from private parties like the defendants. See N.Y. 
Const. Art. I, §§ 6, 12. Additionally, although Section 
11 has been held to apply to private, as well as state 
discrimination, it is not an independent source for a 
cause of action of discrimination under New York 
law. See Tarshis v. Riese Org., 195 F. Supp. 2d 518, 
528 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d 66 F. App’x 238 (2d Cir. 
2003).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court 
denies defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment on the claim under Title III of the 
ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182; the claim under 
the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; and 
the claim under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, 
including the damages issue. The Court 
grants defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment on plaintiff’s other state law 
claims.
SO ORDERED.
JOSEPH F. BIANCO 
United States District Judge
Dated: September 20, 2012 
Central Islip, NY
* * *
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Brewington, Law Offices of Frederick K. 
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represented by Steven G. Storch, Kathleen 
Elizabeth Wright, and Thomas McKee 
Monahan, Storch, Amini & Munves, P.C., 
140 East 45th Street, 25th Floor, New York, 
NY 10017.
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